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THE 2005 WORLD SUMMIT: SOFT
PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
IN SEPTEMBER THE 2005 World Summit saw
more than 170 government leaders descend
upon United Nations headquarters in New
York City to celebrate the 60th anniversary of
the founding of the UN. Although the
Summit’s original purpose was to discuss
progress on the Millennium Development
Goals, the meeting largely focused on UN
reform. Recent controversies, including the
Security Council’s splintering over the invasion
of Iraq, the corruption in Iraq’s Oil-for-Food
program, and the questionable membership of
the Human Rights Commission, have dam-
aged UN credibility and prompted many gov-
ernments to push for significant changes.
Despite progress made at the Summit, it is
unclear whether the UN will soon achieve
effective reforms. 
After intense, around-the-clock negotia-
tions, the 2005 World Summit outcome doc-
ument was finalized on September 20, 2005.
The General Assembly (GA) has already
adopted the document, which details a long
list of affirmations and proposed changes to
UN bodies. A majority of Member States
and the public were disappointed, however,
largely because they saw the outcome docu-
ment as lacking the teeth to make substantial
improvements. Swiss President Samuel
Schmid spoke for many when he said,
“Switzerland has worked hard to obtain
more, but nonetheless the final result will be
a glass that is half-full rather than half-
empty.” More vocal in his criticism, South
African President Thabo Mbeki said, 
We have not made the progress on
the reform of the UN that we should
have … to empower the poor of the
world to extricate themselves from
their misery. Simply put, this means
that the logic of the use of power is
the reinforcement of the might of the
powerful, and therefore the perpetu-
ation of the disempowerment of the
powerless. 
Despite such criticisms, several key reform
proposals involve the protection and promo-
tion of human rights, an indication of the
increasingly prominent status this issue has
attained in the international community.
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
The outcome document creates a
Human Rights Council (Council) that will
replace its discredited predecessor, the
Human Rights Commission (Commission).
Countries with notoriously abysmal human
rights records, such as Sudan, Libya, and
Zimbabwe, have been elected to and have
actively participated in the Commission,
causing substantial public outrage, in large
part because Commission members may
block investigations into human rights abus-
es within their borders. Adding to Western
disapproval of the Commission was the May
2001 election, when the United States was
voted off the panel for the first time since its
creation in 1947. In an April 7, 2005,
speech to delegates in Geneva, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented,
“We have reached a point at which the com-
mission’s declining credibility has cast a
shadow on the reputation of the United
Nations system as a whole and where piece-
meal reforms will not be enough.” 
Ideally, the new Council represents a step
toward a world where gross human rights vio-
lations will be met with less impunity. In real-
ity, however, the differences between the cur-
rent Commission and the proposed Council
are yet to be determined. The outcome docu-
ment endows the Council with the task of
“promoting the universal respect for the pro-
tection of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms.” With little additional guidance,
the President of the GA is “to conduct open,
transparent, and inclusive negotiations, to be
completed as soon as possible during the six-
tieth session, with the aim of establishing the
mandate, modalities, functions, size, compo-
sition, membership, working methods, and
procedures of the Council.” Although central
components such as the size and composition
of the body remain unresolved, it is likely the
Council will meet continuously and have sig-
nificant NGO participation.
The Commission is currently a subsidiary
of the Economic and Social Council, which
elects Commission members. Comprising 53
states, the Commission sits for a six-week ses-
sion once a year in Geneva. In his March
2005 report, “In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development Security and Human Rights for
All,” Annan suggests that the Council be a
subsidiary body of the GA, that members be
elected by a two-thirds majority vote, and
that it have a smaller membership than the
current Commission. This well-supported
proposal seeks to keep egregious abuser states
off the Council, but it failed in negotiations
leading to the final outcome document, as
did the clause excluding known human rights
violators. Most Member States and NGOs
have agreed, however, that the new Council
should be a standing body that meets contin-
uously throughout the year. In addition to
ensuring more timely and effective decisions,
frequent meetings could put an end to some
nations’ current practice of releasing political
prisoners just before the six-week session,
only to imprison them again thereafter.
NGOs often provide vital information
about political prisoners and other disadvan-
taged populations to the Commission. This
led many nations, including the United
States, to advocate that NGOs maintain
their important role as consultants and
observers to the Council. NGOs have the
independence to monitor and publicize
human rights abuses more freely than some
Commission members. Some groups offered
recommendations for determining the new
Council’s membership. Human Rights
Watch, for example, suggested that Council
members be subject to a peer-review mecha-
nism, while others advocate a more strict set
of requirements to qualify for Council mem-
bership. James Paul, Executive Director of
the New York-based Global Policy Forum
has cautioned, however, that few would
qualify if such a checklist existed. 
It will be crucial for the Council to retain
the positive aspects of the Commission, such
as NGO participation, while ameliorating
its serious flaws. For example, the Council
should include more stringent membership
controls and upgrade its status to that of a
standing subsidiary body of the GA. It
remains to be seen how the president of the
GA will steer the negotiations toward these
well-supported goals. 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The 2005 World Summit outcome doc-
ument announced the international com-
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munity’s “responsibility to protect” those
whose governments leave them vulnerable to
gross human rights violations. Commonly
known as R2P, this doctrine obliges each
Member State to protect its citizens and oth-
ers within its jurisdiction from war crimes,
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity. It also calls for interna-
tional diplomatic and humanitarian inter-
vention, as well as the use of peacekeeping
troops in situations where mass atrocities
and gross human rights violations are taking
place, and where peaceful means are inade-
quate to counter such abuses. Notably, the
doctrine supports the collective intervention
of the international community, rather than
that of a single state or small group of states. 
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
Although R2P does not specifically
address post-conflict situations, Member
States agreed to formulate an inter-govern-
mental Peacebuilding Commission (PC).
This advisory body will assemble relevant
actors to coordinate the reconstruction and
institution-building efforts for effective and
integrated post-conflict development.
Participants will include the country or
countries in question, regional governments,
major contributors to the relief effort, UN
experts, and international financial institu-
tions. Each PC meeting will address a specif-
ic country or sub-region. The PC will also
have a standing organizational committee
that can refer situations to the PC and that
will be composed of members of the
Security Council, ECOSOC, top UN
donors, and those states providing the bulk
of military aid. To fund these initiatives,
Member States asked the Secretary-General
to establish a post-conflict Peacebuilding
Fund, supported by voluntary contribu-
tions. The PC is scheduled to begin its work
by the end of this year.
Additionally, Member States endorsed
creating a standing police force that would
provide start-up capability and general assis-
tance to the policing component of UN
peacekeeping missions. The idea grew from
the need to have a rapid response team that
would be able to assist operations in crisis.
This police force is less powerful than the
standing military force some member coun-
tries sought to establish, and questions




THE UNITED NATIONS’ new initiatives rep-
resent the international community’s
increased focus on mainstreaming human
rights. The Human Rights Council, the
Responsibility to Protect, and the
Peacebuilding Commission signify a step
forward in the protection and promotion of
human rights around the world. Moreover,
the decision of Member States at the 2005
World Summit to double the funding for
the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights over the next five years is
another good indicator of an increased com-
mitment to defending human rights. The
remaining question is whether the funding
and political will exist to make these organi-
zations as transparent, credible, and effective
as possible. Critics fear that to make only
cosmetic changes from a Commission to a
Council, or to proclaim a specific responsi-
bility and then fail to execute it, would not
only defeat the reform efforts, but would
further endanger current and future victims
of gross human rights violations. HRB
Nicholas Leddy, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
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(May 8, 2003). The United States government is not the only government to
oppose the use of the ATCA in claims against transnational corporations. In
July 2005 the Toronto Star newspaper reported that the Canadian government
had for the third time attempted to put pressure on U.S. authorities to have
the Talisman case thrown out. See Sudan: The Passion of the Present, Canada
Asked U.S. to Intervene in Talisman Case, http://platform.blogs.com/pas-
sionofthepresent/2005/07/canada_asked_us.html (July 7, 2005),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000082&sid=aiVqEtJAcbI0&re
fer=canada (July 6, 2005).
8 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
9 EarthRights International, In Our Court: ATCA, Sosa and the Triumph of
Human Rights: A report about the Alien Tort Claims Act, http://www.earth-
rights.org/pubs/inourcourt.html (July 2004).
10 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), as cited in Joseph, Corporations (Hart Publishing 2004). In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, the court agreed that interna-
tional criminal law was the appropriate source of law in determining whether
the corporate defendant had aided and abetted the Sudanese government in
committing war crimes and genocide. 
11 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
12 Joseph, Corporations (2004).
13 Anthony J. Sebok, Unocal Announces it will Settle a Human Rights Suits:
What is the Real Story Behind its Decision?, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
sebok/20050110.html (Jan. 10, 2005).
14 See Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in
Human Rights Abuses, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 339 (2001), for a
discussion of the different types of complicity and the use of the terms “benefi-
cial” or “indirect” complicity. Note that the authors classify the Unocal litiga-
tion in this category rather than as an example of direct complicity based on a
different understanding of the facts of the case.
15 Initially, Unocal’s business partner French oil company Total SA was a co-
defendant, but it was held in Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 27 F.Supp.2d 1174
(C.D. Cal. 1998), that the California court did not have jurisdiction over
the company.
16 Sebok, Unocal Announces it will Settle a Human Rights Suits,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050110.html.
17 For example, it was held in Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372,
1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000), that the plaintiff could bring a claim under the ATCA
for violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
18 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, No. 01 Civ.9882, 2005
WL 2082847, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005).
19 Talisman, 374 F. Supp. 2d 331.
20 Note, however, that the court refused to grant leave to appeal on this point,
stating that the case would proceed whether or not secondary liability was
accepted because the plaintiffs also alleged primary liability.
21 Talisman, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 340-341.
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